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Research/Private Equity / Financial Services

Private EquityFinancial Services

The Institutionalization of Private Market Liquidity

Jefrin Jabez Christian

Hong Kong

19 Oct 2026

Companies now wait 14 years to go public, and private markets have built their own ways to exit. Here is what that means for pricing, risk and who actually gets paid.

There was a time when going public was the whole point. You built the thing, raised a few rounds, and somewhere around year four or five you rang a bell, got a ticker symbol, and everybody got paid. In 1999, the median tech company reached the public markets at four or five years old. Today that number is about fourteen. For companies worth $500 million or more, it’s roughly eleven and a half.

Read that again. A generation of founders, employees and fund managers have had the finish line moved back by more than a decade. And we all know what happens when one door is closed - another one is built. The numbers say that this new door is now carrying a startling share of the traffic.

The Exit Bottleneck

In 1996, more than 8,000 companies were listed on U.S. exchanges. Today it’s barely over 4,000. Meanwhile the private market seems to have ballooned: there were 39 unicorns in 2013 and more than 1,500 now, together worth north of $5 trillion.

The waiting has considerable costs. A typical venture-backed company now takes 8.4 years to get from Series A to an exit, up from 6.1 in 2019, and the median gap between funding rounds hit a record 696 days. Only 37% of 2019-vintage venture funds have returned a single dollar to their investors. Nearly $1 trillion of unrealised value sits on U.S. venture fund books, and at the current pace of distributions it would take about twenty years to clear.

Take a fund that earns a 3.0x gross multiple. Stretch its life from ten years to thirteen and its net IRR drops by roughly a quarter, enough to shove a top-quartile fund into the bottom quartile without a single investment going bad. Serves as a classic example of the clock eating the return.

The Expansion of Secondary Market Volume

Global secondary volume, which is investors buying existing stakes from other investors, hit a record of roughly $233 to $240 billion in 2025, up somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50% in a year. I find it oddly reassuring that Jefferies, Lazard, Evercore and Campbell Lutyens, four banks with every incentive to differ, all landed within about six percent of one another.

Venture got its own big slice: $106.3 billion in secondary volume, close to a third of all venture-backed exits. Meanwhile, company-run tender offers, where the business itself organizes a sale of employee and early-investor shares, reached about $35 billion in the U.S. last year, against roughly $45 billion raised in IPOs. And that's dangerously close to parity.

In 2022, a company that ran a tender would typically wait 899 days before running another. By 2025 that gap was 132 days. Carta administered 71 tenders in the first half of 2026, about $3 billion in all, both the highest first-half figures Carta has logged in at least six years.

It seems that liquidity has stopped being a perk and has started to become a recruiting requirement. If your competitor for engineers is a public company handing out stock that can be sold on Monday, “Trust us, there’ll be an IPO someday” is not exactly a strong pitch. Companies shifting towards more frequent tenders should be seen as being competitive rather than generosity.

Valuation Dispersion Beneath the Median

Here’s the headline that made the rounds this summer. On Forge Global, the median private-company share traded at par to its last funding round as of June 30, for the first time since early 2022. At the end of 2025 it had been 11% below. Carta’s tender data agrees: the median discount in tenders held a year or more after a funding round was zero.

While it is a nice number, one would be advised not to lean on it. Doesn't take long to figure out why - look at the spread underneath. In June, the 90th percentile of trades cleared at a 79% premium to the last round. The 75th was at +23%. The 25th was at a 32% discount, and the 10th at a 50% discount. It is almost as if two markets are sharing one average.

In the first one, a handful of AI, space and defense names are being bid up by sovereign funds, crossover investors and private equity. In the report’s data, Anthropic raised at $350 billion in late 2025 and was being quoted between $1.0 and $1.2 trillion on secondary platforms by May. The ten most valuable private AI companies gained an average of 327% in 2025. The number of private companies worth $100 billion or more went from two to at least six.

But even up there, gravity holds. OpenAI closed a primary round at $852 billion in March, and by May its shares were trading at roughly that level, with some bids sliding underneath it as buyers fretted over some $600 billion in future chip and cloud commitments. Being a megacorn does not seem to give you immunity.

In the second market, about half of U.S. venture-backed tech companies are sitting below their last private valuation. You won’t see that in the official down-round numbers, which peaked near 16% in 2025 and had eased below 14% by the fourth quarter, because companies can avoid a formal repricing for a very long time. They stretch the gap between rounds, they take structured deals, or they get acquired by consolidators like Bending Spoons at prices that nobody announces proudly.

Furthermore, while tender offers look cheap on the Carta data, it is partly self-selection: the strong companies are the ones that run official tenders. For growth-stage companies in the $200 million to $2 billion range with no IPO on the horizon, negotiated tenders cleared at a median 18% discount, with a typical range of 8% to 32%.

The Evolving Role of the IPO

If the biggest gains now happen before listing, what does that do to the IPO itself? The class of 2025 might offer us a clue. Proceeds rose more than 55% to nearly $45 billion, which sounds like a recovery. But two-thirds of those deals priced below the company’s last private valuation, and the cohort’s weighted-average return of 14% trailed the S&P 500’s 16%.

Forge tracked 20 major venture-backed listings between early 2025 and mid-2026. Only seven were above their offer price at the end of June. The winners did win big though - Hinge Health up about 159%, CoreWeave up 149%, Circle up 102%, and SpaceX, the new giant on the list, up around 27%. However, on the other side, the losers lost big too. Figma and StubHub each lost 45%, Klarna nearly half, BitGo 71%, and Gemini 85%.

I don’t think that means the IPO is dead. A lot of the damage was down to a rough tape for fintech and crypto, and one bad cohort doesn’t necessarily make a trend. But I do think the job description has changed (at least for now). For the very best companies, the IPO is no longer where value gets created. It’s where an already-valued asset gets handed to a much bigger pool of buyers. The public investor arrives late to a party that mostly happened without them. It would be wiser to see it as a liquidity event rather than a launch, and at the right price it can still be a fine buy.

Pricing of Venture Fund Stakes

The other side of this boom is the institutions that need a way out. Pension funds, endowments and funds of funds are selling their positions in older venture funds, and they’re accepting prices that would shock anyone used to seeing the marks on their statements. In 2025, portfolios of LP stakes sold at an average of about 87 cents on the dollar. The spread by asset type gives us more insights:

  • Young buyout funds (under five years old): around 95% of reported value
  • Private credit: about 91%
  • Growth equity: roughly 80% to 83%
  • Venture and growth blended: around 75% to 78%
  • Tail-end funds more than ten years old: about 73%
  • Pure venture funds from the 2017–2021 vintages: 65% to 72%

These discounts seem rational rather than panicky however. Venture marks are reported with a lag, they’re often unverified, and the outcomes are lumpy. A buyer who pays 70 cents for a portfolio of 2021 companies is being compensated for not knowing what the marks are worth. As buyout and credit discounts have narrowed, the thing that now separates good secondary deals from bad ones is how much you can trust the underlying number.

The history is encouraging. Across 2004 to 2023, secondary funds produced a median net IRR around 16%, and only about 1% of mature ones lost money, versus roughly 24% of primary venture funds. However, it is important to remember that these figures come from a period when buying at a discount was a good trade, and the claim of a 99% safety record will be in every fundraising deck for the next five years.

The contrast with continuation vehicles is worth noting. These are structures where a manager moves a trophy asset into a new fund. A small group of about thirteen platforms underwrites most of this market, and single-asset deals for trophy companies are priced at 99.5% to 102% of value. Cheap secondaries and expensive trophies sit in the same market, which tells you how much quality is being priced in.

Institutional Consolidation and the Retail Distribution Channel

In the space of ten months, three of the biggest names in finance moved into this corner of the market. Morgan Stanley bought EquityZen in January and promptly halved the buyer fee from 5% to 2.5%. Charles Schwab completed its $660 million purchase of Forge Global in March. And on October 8, Goldman Sachs filed paperwork for a venture and growth fund, built on its January acquisition of Industry Ventures, with a $25,000 minimum investment.

The Forge deal is a good reminder of what’s being bought. Forge lost about $268 million cumulatively over fiscal 2022 to 2024. Nobody paid $660 million for those earnings. They paid for the customers and for the pipe into a wealthy, underserved clientele.

I’m not cynical about this on principle. Giving ordinary affluent investors a route into private companies is a good thing, and lower fees are an unambiguous win. But here’s the problem: the institutions are the sellers, at 65 to 78 cents on the dollar, and the new product is being sold to people who can’t easily see what the institutions see. If a flood of retail money chases venture secondaries, it could bid prices up toward par and erase the very discount that made the opportunity attractive. Popular strategies have a habit of ruining themselves.

Structured Preferred Equity and the Preference Stack Risk

When a company wants cash but doesn’t want to admit a lower valuation, it can take a deal that keeps the shiny headline price and loads the terms instead. People in the business call these “dirty term sheets,” which is about right.

Typical pricing runs 10% to 14% all-in: a 6% to 9% cash coupon, a 3% to 5% dividend that compounds in kind, an origination fee, and some warrants on top. Liquidation preferences of 1.5x to 2x are common. Sometimes there’s a full ratchet, which reprices all of an investor’s shares if the company ever sells stock cheaper, or a participating feature that lets the investor take their preference and a share of what’s left.

The nightmare scenario is arithmetic. Take FanDuel’s 2018 sale, an older case but a clean illustration: it sold for $465 million against a $559 million stack of preferences. Preferred holders took everything. Founders and employees received nothing. Because many of these protections fall away at a qualified IPO, the investor holding them has a reason to prefer a sale at a price just above their stack over waiting for a public listing that might be worth more to everyone else.

I think everyone in the room has a reason to look away. The founder keeps a $1 billion-plus headline. The existing venture investors avoid writing down their fund marks while they’re out raising the next one. The cost lands on the people who aren’t at the table: employees with common stock, and any secondary buyer who picked up shares without reading the cap table. If you buy common stock in a private company in 2026, read the stack first. The 2021 habit of ignoring it is now a very expensive one.

Issuer Tender Offers and Founder Leverage

It is also worth noting that secondary sales are now built into about 34% of growth-stage primary rounds, up from 12% in 2021. Founders who take some chips off the table, typically 5% to 15% of their holdings, have been shown to behave differently. In one founder survey, 71% of those who’d completed a structured secondary reported less financial stress, and they were about 2.3 times more likely to turn down an acquisition offer below their internal target. It’s self-reported data so one should not take it at face value, but the mechanism makes sense. Someone who can pay their mortgage can say no to a bad offer.

The result is a barbell. The strongest companies stay independent, run tenders every few months, and become very hard to buy cheaply. The bottom half, whose preference stacks are too heavy to support employee liquidity, ends up on the shopping list of consolidators and private equity roll-ups. Fewer middle outcomes, more extremes.

However, it is reasonable to say that there is still friction. A direct share transfer can sit for 30 to 45 days in a company’s right-of-first-refusal window, and the company can step in to buy the shares itself or simply refuse to approve the transfer. Add commissions of 2% to 5% and the bid-ask spreads on thinly traded names, and a quick round trip in private shares is anything but cheap. That’s a big part of why issuer-run tenders, where the company itself manages the process, are winning.

Conclusions

The broader point is that private markets used to be a waiting room, a place you sat until the public markets called your name. It’s now a place you can live, raise money, pay your people, get acquired, or compound for fifteen years. It means that a lot of money, and a lot of retirement savings, is quietly settling into a room with no windows, where the prices are set by a few buyers and the terms are in documents very few people read.

Sources and References

Market data and research reports

Transactions and filings

Structured equity and capital structure